Introduction
Extreme weather events (EWEs) such as intense typhoons, heavy precipitation, and prolonged drought conditions have already shown how the structures and functions of ecosystems can be easily and quickly transformed, destroying thousands of lives and livelihoods. Social conflicts and resource breakdowns occurring after such events are also far-reaching. Aside from the shortage of basic needs, communities have to deal with the possibilities of various forms of conflicts that result from the collapse of social and physical infrastructure in EWE-ravaged areas. Weak governance systems in these areas exacerbate the consequences of collapsed physical infrastructure. In other words, climate change can create conditions to disturb social harmony, thereby affecting sustainable development.
This briefing discusses two EWE case studies in the Philippines: a supertyphoon in the Visayas islands and a prolonged drought following an El Niño in Mindanao island. The cases help illustrate how social and resource stresses could easily and quickly germinate during (in the Mindanao case) or shortly after (in the Visayas case) an EWE. EWE-social conflict linkages are, of course, complex and challenging to predict or, at the very least, tease out (Robbins & Moore 2013); however, it is argued that a careful study of EWE-induced conflicts is necessary, especially in climate-vulnerable communities, such as those in the Philippines. Incorporating lessons learned from this analysis to policy is also of utmost importance; hence, the briefing concludes by offering a synergetic policy framework that recognises the EWE-social conflict nexus.
The Philippines, an archipelagic country of more than 7,500 islands, is at the cusp of climate change. It serves as a microcosm of severe climate-related impacts now and in the future. The Philippine Government has identified five climate-related risk factors for Filipinos: sea level rise, extreme precipitation, extreme heating, increased ocean temperatures, and fresh water disturbance. The northern parts of the archipelago might experience more intense precipitation; central Luzon could face higher risks of typhoons; and western Mindanao will have to deal with greater risks of drought. EWEs will only exacerbate the almost omnipresent Philippine development challenges, like lack of sturdy infrastructure, increasing population and urbanisation, and dearth of effective social and institutional support. It seems the Philippines will venture into a new space where climate change multiplies existing threats to Filipino lives and their livelihoods, peace and security, and more broadly, its sustainable development.
Haiyan and the Tacloban Disruptions
The Philippines is no stranger to strong typhoons. The social crisis that ensued highlights the social constitution of disasters befalling human societies. In Tacloban -the epicentre of the crisis, the excruciatingly slow arrival of rescue and delivery of aid, and the desperation of survivors, who saw that they were not getting the help they pleaded for, resulted in a social breakdown.
1 'Looting' occupied the centre of the narrative as survivors looked for food and water (Commission on Audit 2014). 'Looters' dug up underground water pipes and smashed them open (Marshall & Grudgings 2013) . When 'looters' tried to break into a public building that stocked rice, eight people were killed when its wall collapsed (Hodal & Branigan 2013) . The narrative of 'looting' generally animated and organised militarised interventions by the government into the Tacloban disaster zones, where a de facto martial law was considered to be in effect (Romero 2013) .
2 Army and police contingents numbering more than 300 were deployed to the city in personnel carriers. Tacloban looked like a war zone inasmuch as it was a disaster area.
Obviously, climate is just a part of Tacloban's more complex story. Adding to these naturally occurring vulnerabilities is the developmental profile of the Philippines: a fast-growing population, increasing urbanisation, poor physical and social infrastructure, and entrenched poverty. The proximity to the sea of many Philippine cities, where many Filipinos seek economic opportunities, also increases exposure to vulnerability. Coastal flooding is where you can find the most critical vulnerabilities of many communities. Another factor that made Haiyan lethal is poverty and shoddy dwelling construction. The country's weak institutions across its multiple levels of governance are another factor. These institutional limitations led to a disorganised, uncoordinated, and inefficient response. Squabbling between the local and national governments was also intense. EWE created social tensions and conflict; and weak institutions, poverty and lower levels of development exacerbated all of these.
Prolonged Drought and the Kidapawan Disruptions
While post-Haiyan situation in Tacloban shows how an EWE-social conflict can materialise in a coastal space, the risks with the Philippine interior communities cannot be disregarded. The scientific community agrees that these spaces can also be subject to climate impacts such as more frequent and extreme droughts, high temperatures that could lead to heat waves, and increasing heavy downpours (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[IPCC] 2014). As these events pan out, lives and livelihoods, food systems, infrastructures, and social order are effectively put at higher risk. The 2016 disruptions in Kidapawan City following a prolonged drought provide an illustration.
Kidapawan is the capital of the province of North Cotabato in central Mindanao. In late March until early April 2016, the city became a venue of a supposedly EWE-triggered crisis: a prolonged drought following an El Niño. An El Niño refers to a large-scale ocean-atmosphere climate interaction linked to a periodic warming in sea surface temperatures across the central and east-central Equatorial Pacific. The Philippines is located within this region. While an El Niño disrupts the normal weather patterns and, in effect, results in an intense storm in some places, it brings droughts in others. The long dry spell that followed the 2016 El Niño led to what has been labelled as the Kidapawan crisis.
While the event did not claim as many lives as Haiyan, the tragic social conflict that ensued quickly captured the national imagination. On 30 March 2016, some 6,000 farmers and indigenous peoples from various parts of North Cotabato province, who for months were severely affected by the drought, occupied the Cotabato-Davao highway demanding that the provincial government immediately release calamity funds and provide rice to stop hunger from spreading. This demand for rice supply until recovery from the drought, however, was not quickly heeded; instead, the provincial government, claiming that there was inadequate supply, offered the farmers only three kilos of rice per family. On 1 April, the police dispersed the protestors, an exercise that deteriorated into violence. Shots were fired from both sides. Reports varied regarding fatalities and injuries. According to one source, two farmer protesters died while 116 were reported injured. Another account said two died and 13 were injured from the protesters' side, while at least 23 police officers were injured (Associated Press 2016). On 2 April, the farmers regrouped at the local Methodist church but the police surrounded them soon thereafter and some 78 protesters were subsequently arrested.
But climate change should not be used as a scapegoat in the Kidapawan crisis. Fingers also have to be pointed toward institutional breakdown, in particular the government's failure to address the lingering poverty and inequity in the Cotabato provinces. The province of North Cotabato is not new to such crisis situations. In 1990, farmers took about 500 sacks of rice from National Food Authority warehouses in President Roxas municipality. In 1993, drought-stricken farmers took 3,000 sacks of rice from the Authority's Columbio warehouse, in the neighbouring Sultan Kudarat Province (Lara 2016). The presence of governance frameworks anticipating an almost regularly occurring situation and a carefully conceived crisis response could have helped deflect drought-initiated crisis towards non-violent consequences. The EWE exacerbated existing social tensions and conflict, hence destabilising lives and livelihoods, food systems, and social order.
Conclusion and Recommendations
This briefing narrates two contemporary EWE-induced social breakdowns in the Philippines, the causes of which can be attributed to the fast-changing global climate system. With climate change, supertyphoons and prolonged drought events are expected to frequent the country. These exacerbate the risks and vulnerabilities of many Filipinos, who are already suffering from many development-related challenges. The EWE-induced conflicts in Tacloban and Kidapawan offered lenses to view future relationships between EWEs and their potentialities to exacerbate existing threats. While the memories of Tacloban and Kidapawan remain emotionally charged, they, as this briefing shows, also provide lessons for crafting climate-resilient and sustainable societies.
Revisiting the memories of 2013 Tacloban and 2016 Kidapawan means not only remembering the many lives that were lost to EWEs and to social breakdowns that ensued, but also taking away the many lessons that these events have provided, especially in terms of better adaptation, policy and planning. Preparations for people-centred climate resiliency that recognises the possible implications of such events to social conflicts need to be revisited and adjusted as necessary. Best practices require understanding EWErelated risks and preparing for them from multiple vantage points: from the social to physical to economic to institutional levels. Most important, however, is to heed the warning of how easily EWEs can be manipulated by those in power, raising yet again the question: whose social interests need to be protected at times like these? The next paragraphs attempt to address these challenges.
Infrastructure, especially evacuation centres, needs to be sturdier. In case of deadly storms, these facilities need to withstand the ferocity of typhoons. The exposure of critical infrastructure systems to these hazards further magnifies vulnerabilities because energy, transportation, telecommunication, and water systems are highly interdependent. An impact on one can quickly cascade on to other infrastructure systems during an EWE. In Haiyan energy supply was totally cut off, food and fuel were in short supply, and roads and an airport were physically damaged. These problems made the provision of immediate care, restoration of electricity and roads, and relief work in hardest-hit areas extremely challenging. In the case of prolonged droughts, these infrastructures include access to basic needs like food and water. The availability and proximity of supply centres to those who would likely need them should be thought out in advance. Dangerous coastal areas, where the risks of storm surges are at the highest, should be off-limits for development. Building codes need to be updated taking into account the new dangers brought about by EWEs. Yet, infrastructures not only refer to physical ones, they also pertain to how societies are ordered: policy, plans, and cooperative work.
Governments can no longer afford to govern using the norms of the past. EWEs and their ramifications, alongside the lingering challenges of poverty and social inequity, have to be strongly incorporated in policy design. The crucial challenge that needs to be faced is who gets to dominate in an EWE aftermath, especially when social conflicts ensue. In other words, whose social interests need to be protected, and how such level of protection can be extended effectively. The same goes with early preparations: governments should embed EWE adaptation in all their work: from planning to execution to monitoring.
Public institutions need to cohere with each other. Implementing detailed resiliency plans helps in reducing natural disaster exposures -and following the logic set out above, helps reduce social breakdowns. These plans will become more important as climate change increases EWE risks. Early warning systems, shelter and evacuation plans, and coastal embankments can help reduce the number of deaths from typhoons; the same can be said with drought-resilient crops. It is however worth noting that even better technologies and infrastructure are not always a panacea. The Philippines' archipelagic configuration will mean that those who received warnings have simply nowhere to go. Nonetheless, this does not mean plans have to be discarded altogether; it only highlights greater need to incorporate social resiliency -with the focus of pre-and post-disaster support on communal bond strengthening. In the Philippines, the spirit of bayanihan (or helping each other) needs to be brought back to the core of these plans. In other words, post-disaster plans should factor in strategies for nurturing social cohesion, especially in impoverished, vulnerable, and high-risk communities.
Primary to increased resiliency is the focus on localised solutions: particularly in communities. Human societies, in the event of disaster, do not necessarily collapse into a Hobbesian state of chaos, rather people tend to pull together and become more cooperative (Solnit 2009 ). The most important aspect of a climate-resilient Philippines, therefore, is to understand the varied risks relevant for each community, and cascading this understanding across levels -and to find nodes where stronger cooperation could thrive. These exercises involve capacitating local communities to make their own EWE-related long-term risk assessments, scenario analyses, forecasts and plans spanning the potential changes in local land use, population movements, and infrastructures. Giving premium to local knowledge helps in dealing with the many associated uncertainties of current and future climate risks, including social tensions and conflict most especially.
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Endnotes
1 Looting became possible in Tacloban where there was weak governance and breakdown of disaster and risk reduction management systems supposed to be in place as required by law. For instance the Tacloban mayor, who was supposed to head the internal command system in the event of a disaster, was the first one to 'disappear' from the disaster scene, claiming that he was also a victim, as much as his constituents were. The widespread confusion among the survivors was exacerbated by this lack of an authority figure to provide guidance to relief volunteers and to the survivors on where to go for help.
